Hi! It’s been a while. This seems like as good a time as any to update. For the past eight months or so I have been in the process of a long transition that is finally coming to a close. I have now finished writing and successfully defending my dissertation, have packed and moved across the pond, and taken up the mantle of ‘Arche postdoc’ and the hectic lifestyle that goes along with it. I’ve left UConn and proud to now call myself a part of the Foundations of Logical Consequence project in the Arche Research Centre (St Andrews). For anyone unfamiliar with the centre, the pace of activities here is impressive to say the least. There are far more seminars, reading groups, visiting speakers, and workshops than one can possibly keep up with. It’s just an amazing wealth of opportunities. Recently I have been reading a bit about substructural logics and multiple-conclusion logics. With the upcoming Christmas break looming on the horizon, I would like to get back to blogging. Keep your eye on this space for more.
It’s Official…
20 September, 2009 — Colin… I am now “Dr. Caret”! And what a relief it is. Many thanks are owed to my advisors JC Beall, Graham Priest, and Lionel Shapiro, faculty mentors Michael Lynch, Don Baxter, Tim Elder, and Reed Solomon (maths) as well as classmates Aaron Cotnoir, Doug Owings, Nhat Long Vu, Rik Hine, Matt Clemens, Michael Hughs, and Jeremy Wyatt.
The Unreality of Logic
22 August, 2009 — ColinReally amusing stuff. The context of the quote below is this: Richard Sylvan (Routley) describes the differences between, e.g. relevant and modal semantics as differences in the grain of the ontology, which can produce problematic results if we try to understand highly intensional functors (entailment and the like) through the crude modal framework. He goes on…
In hardline classical theory matters deteriorate still further, through assumption of a one world modelling; that the only world, or at least the only world that matters logically, is the actual world… This is backed up by familiar propaganda about logic requiring a robust sense of reality and the like. In fact it doesn’t; and shouldn’t.
from “What is that Item Designated Negation?” in Gabbay & Wansing, (eds.) What is Negation? (1999), p.307
More Blog Rankings
5 July, 2009 — ColinHere is an interesting compilation of rankings of Top Philosophy Blogs. Amongst all of these rankings, we find that the Feminist Philosophers‘ blog and such Chinese philosophy blogs as Chris Panza’s and Manyul Im’s get top billing. This is quite impressive and does seem to point to the power of blogging in bringing attention to what are often minority sub-disciplines within the profession.
(HT: Feminist Philosophers)
Circular Definitions
17 May, 2009 — ColinI am reading the website for the UK Border Agency, trying to figure out how this new “points based” system works. In order to get Entry Clearance to work in the UK, one has to navigate the points calculator which gives a number of options for your migrant status. I want to know who applies under the respective categories of skilled worker, highly skiller worker, etc. The website has a section titled:
“You can apply under the highly skilled worker category now if you are:”
After which a number of bullet points, the last of which is below.
“applying for permission to enter the United Kingdom (known as ‘entry clearance’) under the highly skilled worker category.”
Helpful, no?
R.I.P. Bob Meyer
6 May, 2009 — ColinWas literally just thinking to myself earlier today: “I should really see some of the great philosophers, like Bob Meyer, while they are still around.” Tonight I heard that Meyer passed away. Never knew the man so nothing personal to say, but I find his thought increasingly influential and his style enviable. I’ll just quote my favorite Meyer passage in tribute:
There is an intuitive parity between underdetermination and overdetermination with respect to a given [sentence]. This parity is wrecked by the paradoxes of implication. Overdetermination — [inconsistency] — triggers classically a psychotic break. Underdetermination — incompleteness – is by contrast relatively painless.”
Robert K. Meyer, Entailment (1971)
The Divine Liar
2 May, 2009 — ColinConsider the Divine Liar: it is possible for God to assert “I do not exist”. Whatever God asserts is true, so if God were to assert “I do not exist”, then God would not exist. In order to assert anything God has to exist, so if God were to assert “I do not exist”, then God would exist. Thus, if God were to assert “I do not exist” then God would both exist and not exist. So it is possible for God to both exist and not exist. But whether or not God exists, he does (or does not) necessarily. Thus, God both exists and does not exist.
What is Possible
16 April, 2009 — ColinIf we want to know what is possible, we can sidestep questions about the nature of possible worlds and jump straight to the question of their closure conditions. I accept that natural language utterances of “possibly…” are ambiguous between at least several senses: epistemic, physical, and metaphysical amongst them. Some philosophers think there is a sensible notion of “possibility in the broadest sense” which they sometimes equate with metaphysical or logical possibility. If there is such an all-purpose notion of possibility, I think we might do no better than the following suggestion at characterizing it.
Define a standard propositional language 
Philosophy Ended and Begun Again
7 April, 2009 — ColinOh, stupid blogosphere, let me count the ways you have found to waste my time and energy. And yet, I must share the same with others. Here’s the entertainment for the day: David Brooks has a piece titled “The End of Philosophy” in the NY Times which hardly lives up to its incendiary title; he is fittingly refuted in, of all places, this web comic by Chaospet. Enjoy!
April Fool’s Wit
1 April, 2009 — ColinDid Leiter really think this was funny? Maybe I have a poor sense of humor? I dunno…
