More Blog Rankings July 5, 2009
Posted by Colin in Odds 'n' Ends.2 comments
Here is an interesting compilation of rankings of Top Philosophy Blogs. Amongst all of these rankings, we find that the Feminist Philosophers‘ blog and such Chinese philosophy blogs as Chris Panza’s and Manyul Im’s get top billing. This is quite impressive and does seem to point to the power of blogging in bringing attention to what are often minority sub-disciplines within the profession.
(HT: Feminist Philosophers)
Circular Definitions May 17, 2009
Posted by Colin in Language.add a comment
I am reading the website for the UK Border Agency, trying to figure out how this new “points based” system works. In order to get Entry Clearance to work in the UK, one has to navigate the points calculator which gives a number of options for your migrant status. I want to know who applies under the respective categories of skilled worker, highly skiller worker, etc. The website has a section titled:
“You can apply under the highly skilled worker category now if you are:”
After which a number of bullet points, the last of which is below.
“applying for permission to enter the United Kingdom (known as ‘entry clearance’) under the highly skilled worker category.”
Helpful, no?
R.I.P. Bob Meyer May 6, 2009
Posted by Colin in Announcements.2 comments
Was literally just thinking to myself earlier today: “I should really see some of the great philosophers, like Bob Meyer, while they are still around.” Tonight I heard that Meyer passed away. Never knew the man so nothing personal to say, but I find his thought increasingly influential and his style enviable. I’ll just quote my favorite Meyer passage in tribute:
There is an intuitive parity between underdetermination and overdetermination with respect to a given [sentence]. This parity is wrecked by the paradoxes of implication. Overdetermination — [inconsistency] — triggers classically a psychotic break. Underdetermination — incompleteness – is by contrast relatively painless.”
Robert K. Meyer, Entailment (1971)
The Divine Liar May 2, 2009
Posted by Colin in Logic, Methodology.12 comments
Consider the Divine Liar: it is possible for God to assert “I do not exist”. Whatever God asserts is true, so if God were to assert “I do not exist”, then God would not exist. In order to assert anything God has to exist, so if God were to assert “I do not exist”, then God would exist. Thus, if God were to assert “I do not exist” then God would both exist and not exist. So it is possible for God to both exist and not exist. But whether or not God exists, he does (or does not) necessarily. Thus, God both exists and does not exist.
What is Possible April 16, 2009
Posted by Colin in Language, Metaphysics, Modality.6 comments
If we want to know what is possible, we can sidestep questions about the nature of possible worlds and jump straight to the question of their closure conditions. I accept that natural language utterances of “possibly…” are ambiguous between at least several senses: epistemic, physical, and metaphysical amongst them. Some philosophers think there is a sensible notion of “possibility in the broadest sense” which they sometimes equate with metaphysical or logical possibility. If there is such an all-purpose notion of possibility, I think we might do no better than the following suggestion at characterizing it.
Define a standard propositional language 
Philosophy Ended and Begun Again April 7, 2009
Posted by Colin in Odds 'n' Ends.add a comment
Oh, stupid blogosphere, let me count the ways you have found to waste my time and energy. And yet, I must share the same with others. Here’s the entertainment for the day: David Brooks has a piece titled “The End of Philosophy” in the NY Times which hardly lives up to its incendiary title; he is fittingly refuted in, of all places, this web comic by Chaospet. Enjoy!
April Fool’s Wit April 1, 2009
Posted by Colin in Odds 'n' Ends.2 comments
Did Leiter really think this was funny? Maybe I have a poor sense of humor? I dunno…
Philosopher’s Digest March 30, 2009
Posted by Colin in Announcements.add a comment
The Philosopher’s Digest looks like a great new site. In a nutshell, the aim of PD is to publish timely online reviews of recent articles in top philosophy journals. Reviewers include Berit Brogaard, Iris Einheuser, and Clayton Littlejohn amongst others. It looks like PD is just getting started (there are only a few reviews as of writing this), but I expect it will be quite a valuable resource.
(HT: Clayton)
Spandrels for You March 23, 2009
Posted by Colin in Announcements.add a comment
Looks like the new book Spandrels of Truth by my advisor JC Beall is in print. I heartily recommend it to everyone, and if you act now you can get a nice discount by clicking on this link.
Granting Too Many Assumptions March 8, 2009
Posted by Colin in Logic.1 comment so far
In his Relevant Logic: a Philosophical Interpretation, Mares discusses several famous examples of arguments for explosion, the principle which says that a contradiction entails everything. What I am about to discuss is, I think, a minor part of Mares’ overall strategy in arguing against explosion, but it struck me as funny so I wanted to say something about it.
C.I. Lewis defended explosion. He also criticized the material conditional. In a critical article, Lewis frames a dialogue between himself and a fictional interlocutor. Lewis remarks to his interlocutor at one point that “If you grant the paradoxer his assumption…” then his conclusions materially follow. By taking seriously the possible truth of certain assumptions he argues that material implication runs into greatly counter-intuitive results. Mares tries to turn the tactic against Lewis:
Suppose that we ‘grant some paradoxer his assumption’ that
is true. We then have to take seriously what would happen in a context in which a contradiction is true. (p.9)
Once we have swallowed this much, we can see that Lewis defense of explosion was wrong. If we take seriously the possibility of true contradictions, then there must be situations in which both of 
This strikes me as a really terrible way to argue against the validity of explosion. After all, what prevents generalizing this argument to absurdity? Take any formal schema at all, for examples consider 
In other words, we can’t just grant anyone whatever assumptions they want in Mares sense. This grants too much. Mares seems be saying that the only way to be fair to our interlocutors in disagreements over logic is to build into our logical framework possibilities in which our interlocutors assumptions hold. But taken generally, this would force us to accept that any proposition is non-trivially possibly true and non-trivially possible false, so nothing follows from anything.
