Comments on: Routes to Vegetarianism

By: Mike

Mike — Wed, 28 May 2008 21:36:47 +0000

I have to say that I have been tempted by the ‘imperceptible benefits’ line of thought… although I’m not sure I see how this relates to the repugnant conclusion.

Suppose we have a device that is designed to increase electrical charge in imperceptible decrements. You need only consider the option of causing one unit of imperceptible charge to each of one thousand people or six hundred units of excruciating electrical charge to one person. Having to concede that the latter is better is the repugnant conclusion (in one of its manifestations).

By: Colin Caret

Colin Caret — Wed, 28 May 2008 18:31:29 +0000

CK, good question. I too would resist eating the meat in that situation, but I can’t explain why that response makes sense. I think we must be aware of some sort of ‘residual’ of the immoral act itself. Someone once said to me that it is wrong to benefit from what is wrong. While I doubt I could defend such a principle in full generality, that seems to be the closest I can come up with to a reason why we shouldn’t eat the meat even in your described situation.

Mike, I guess I was thinking that if the obligation inheres in the group, then each member is obligated. But that depends on why the group is obligated and if it is reducible to something about the causal influence of each members, then your sorites argument would be a problem. I have to say that I have been tempted by the ‘imperceptible benefits’ line of thought… although I’m not sure I see how this relates to the repugnant conclusion.

By: Mike

Mike — Wed, 28 May 2008 15:42:04 +0000

If the Singerian principles carry over as reasons for ‘my group’ to try to cause a decrease in the killing of animals, we face no causal impotence problem. Changing our diet as a group will have a sufficient impact on demand to cause the industry to decrease production.

Part of what makes the objection from causal impotence interesting, I htink, is that this sort of response doesn’t seem to work. You can run the same argument at the level of groups. Even if the contributions of group G does make a (negative or positive)difference, G does not make any greater difference than G-You. G is no more efficacious than G-You. Similarly, G-You is no more efficacious than G-You&Bob. And so on sorites style. One route in response is to count ‘imperceptible harms/benefits’. So, some will argue, it is possible to harm/benefit sentient beings in a way that never perceptibly decreases/increases their well-being. If that’s so, then my contribution to the vegetarian group effort, though imperceptible, is nonetheless beneficial. That’s a reason to contribute. (Incidentally, this leads to Parfit’s “repugnant conclusion”; some consequentialists just bite that bullet).

By: ck

ck — Wed, 28 May 2008 12:28:05 +0000

I’ve thought about this a lot, since I am what some people call a “flexitarian” in part out of laziness and a lack of self-control (i.e. I sometimes enjoy meat). I also struggle with whether my decision to go entirely vegetarian would have the desired consequence of minimizing suffering. From what I’ve read, it sounds like if Americans would give up meat just a few days a week, there could be a significant impact on the industry–I have to look up the sources.

About the goals of the ethical vegetarian–this isn’t very precisely phrased, but I’ve wondered about the situation in which one has meat in front of them. You are incapable of preventing the suffering of that individual animal (it has already) and if your eating the hamburger or steak, what have you, has no impact on the larger numbers of animals suffering, then is it unethical to eat that meal?

My instincts are, well, yes, but apart from that being an instance of me violating my own personal rule not to eat meat, I can’t figure out where that instinct comes from. Thoughts?