Routes to Vegetarianism May 28, 2008
Posted by Colin in Ethics, Veggie.trackback
Here is a subject that I haven’t discussed in a while. Nate Charlow has a nice discussion of the causal impotence objection to ethical vegetarianism in this post with a follow-up discussion here. The gist of his post is that there is a straighforward argument deploying valid inferences of deontic logic to the conclusion that one has an obligation not to eat the flesh of animals needlessly killed for food. I have a few thoughts.
As a vegetarian who takes the causal impotence objection seriously, I feel a need to revisit it briefly to clarify what I take to be its significance. The objection rests on the economic phenomenon that the meat industry, like any industry, does not respond to small fluctuations in demand. So one consumer who changes from an omnivorous diet to a vegetarian diet has too small an impact on demand to cause any change to the number of animals being killed each day by the meat industry. I take it that this data is not meant to challenge the conclusion of ethical vegetarianism directly, but rather to challenge a certain line of consequentialist argument for ethical vegetarianism. Roughly, following someone like Singer, we might think that the needless killing of animals is wrong because animals are sentient and demand equal consideration of their interest not to be harmed. As consequentialists, we thus set out to do what we can to cause a decrease in unnecessary harm, specifically to cause a decrease in the killing of animals. The causal impotence of the individual consumer merely suggests that one person changing her dietary habits alone is ineffective toward the end of preventing animal suffering.
This of course leaves open a variety of responses. Perhaps the appropriate level to locate the obligation is with whole groups — communities, societies, or what have you. If the Singerian principles carry over as reasons for ‘my group’ to try to cause a decrease in the killing of animals, we face no causal impotence problem. Changing our diet as a group will have a sufficient impact on demand to cause the industry to decrease production. So the conclusion of ‘group’ ethical vegetarianism would follow. Alternately, for those are uneasy about the idea of group obligations, perhaps the lesson of causal impotence is that we are obligated to take more direct steps to end the suffering of animals than we had previously thought. Going vegetarian was a nice idea, but if my individual dietary change is not enough to impact the amount of animal suffering in the world, then perhaps my obligations are more robust than I had suspected. Perhaps I have an obligation to intervene with the industry in other ways: by lobbying for legislation banning the killing of animals for food, etc.
How one responds to causal impotence will depend in part on one’s reasons for being vegetarian in the first place. At any rate, I think the causal impotence objection is interesting and worth thinking about because it focuses attention on the connection between the goals of the ethical vegetarian and her method of achieving those goals.
I’ve thought about this a lot, since I am what some people call a “flexitarian” in part out of laziness and a lack of self-control (i.e. I sometimes enjoy meat). I also struggle with whether my decision to go entirely vegetarian would have the desired consequence of minimizing suffering. From what I’ve read, it sounds like if Americans would give up meat just a few days a week, there could be a significant impact on the industry–I have to look up the sources.
About the goals of the ethical vegetarian–this isn’t very precisely phrased, but I’ve wondered about the situation in which one has meat in front of them. You are incapable of preventing the suffering of that individual animal (it has already) and if your eating the hamburger or steak, what have you, has no impact on the larger numbers of animals suffering, then is it unethical to eat that meal?
My instincts are, well, yes, but apart from that being an instance of me violating my own personal rule not to eat meat, I can’t figure out where that instinct comes from. Thoughts?
If the Singerian principles carry over as reasons for ‘my group’ to try to cause a decrease in the killing of animals, we face no causal impotence problem. Changing our diet as a group will have a sufficient impact on demand to cause the industry to decrease production.
Part of what makes the objection from causal impotence interesting, I htink, is that this sort of response doesn’t seem to work. You can run the same argument at the level of groups. Even if the contributions of group G does make a (negative or positive)difference, G does not make any greater difference than G-You. G is no more efficacious than G-You. Similarly, G-You is no more efficacious than G-You&Bob. And so on sorites style. One route in response is to count ‘imperceptible harms/benefits’. So, some will argue, it is possible to harm/benefit sentient beings in a way that never perceptibly decreases/increases their well-being. If that’s so, then my contribution to the vegetarian group effort, though imperceptible, is nonetheless beneficial. That’s a reason to contribute. (Incidentally, this leads to Parfit’s “repugnant conclusion”; some consequentialists just bite that bullet).
CK, good question. I too would resist eating the meat in that situation, but I can’t explain why that response makes sense. I think we must be aware of some sort of ‘residual’ of the immoral act itself. Someone once said to me that it is wrong to benefit from what is wrong. While I doubt I could defend such a principle in full generality, that seems to be the closest I can come up with to a reason why we shouldn’t eat the meat even in your described situation.
Mike, I guess I was thinking that if the obligation inheres in the group, then each member is obligated. But that depends on why the group is obligated and if it is reducible to something about the causal influence of each members, then your sorites argument would be a problem. I have to say that I have been tempted by the ‘imperceptible benefits’ line of thought… although I’m not sure I see how this relates to the repugnant conclusion.
I have to say that I have been tempted by the ‘imperceptible benefits’ line of thought… although I’m not sure I see how this relates to the repugnant conclusion.
Suppose we have a device that is designed to increase electrical charge in imperceptible decrements. You need only consider the option of causing one unit of imperceptible charge to each of one thousand people or six hundred units of excruciating electrical charge to one person. Having to concede that the latter is better is the repugnant conclusion (in one of its manifestations).